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Introduction* 
The European Union (EU) is full of paradoxes and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is one of them. There are many others, deriving 
from the structural determinants of EU law-making and from the 
‘architecture’ of EU decision-making as well as from an apparent 
institutional inability to concede or learn from mistakes.  The German 
scholar, Martin Jänicke, in his book State Failure (1986) uses the 
metaphor of the ‘tank/Panzer’ to describe the ‘privilege of not having 
to be intelligent’ and of pressing on, regardless of immediate 
consequences. The metaphor is arguably applicable to the operations 
of the European Central Bank, to its attendant fiscal policy arm, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and to its predecessor and model, 
the German Bundesbank: 
 
A tank driver can be stupid and blind. In contrast to the cyclist, 
he does not need to adapt to the annoying obstacles of the 
environment. Problems are ‘externalised’: It is not the tank 
driver that is damaged but the environment. In the case of the 
                                          
* This is a slightly expanded version of a paper given in León, Spain, in September 
2011. 
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cyclist, on the other hand, the problems of an adaptive method 
of driving are completely internalised.  
(Jänicke 1986: 158) 
 
The metaphor applies almost entirely to the institution, to the 
structure, and not to the people/agents that work in it and its 
associated System of European Central Banks (ECBS).1 In many 
respects, the people working in such institutions adapt to their 
immutability with the intelligence of the cyclist. There is plenty of 
evidence to indicate that ECB insiders, like their Commission 
counterparts, don’t subscribe to the institutional orthodoxies that 
bind their policy-making but resign themselves to maintaining the 
appearance of doctrinal uniformity as a faute de mieux. The ECB is 
probably too young to have generated a myth of infallibility, such as 
attached to the Bundesbank in the eye of (too) many people, but for 
that it enjoys the dubious privilege of being even more difficult to 
reform than its model. The Bundesbank Law of 1957 could, 
theoretically, have been modified by a parliamentary majority; the 
ECB, as prescribed by the Treaty on European Union of 1992, requires 
the unanimity of all member states to alter its statutory powers and 
its statutory responsibilities. It is this effective immutability, together 
with the lack of effective democratic accountability that provides the 
framework for the following analysis. How do we cope with a tank 
which has 27 drivers and neither a clear map nor a reliable compass? 
 
This analysis is not value-free. It proceeds from a set of philosophical, 
ethical and politico-economic assumptions that inform the 
interpretation of structures, processes, events and ‘facts’. The first is 
that of the extensive interdependence of contemporary human 
existence, which renders local, regional, national and international 
cooperation and solidarity an inescapable requirement of the survival 
of humanity and its habitat. The second is the observation/conviction 
that ‘more equal societies almost always work better’ (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2010) and that significant inequalities of wealth, income, 
power and access to resources are corrosive of human progress. The 
third is that economic theory is at best a heuristic fiction for 
simplifying the understanding of partial processes, at worst a 
dangerous obstacle to the understanding of interdependent systems 
                                          
1 The participants at the conference in León confirmed this view of  the necessary 
separation of institutions from those that work within them 
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of human organisation. The fourth is that political economy as an 
interdisciplinary discipline provides a more adequate basis for the 
diagnosis of socio-economic problems and for halfway appropriate 
prescriptive solutions. 
Multiple asymmetries 
The Bundesbank – the unquestioned parent of the European Central 
Bank – was the dominant actor in a German post-war political 
economy that was characterised by a severe separation of powers 
between the various institutions of macro-economic governance. Its 
autonomous conduct of monetary policy set it apart from the 
(democratically answerable) agents of fiscal policy at federal, regional 
and local level. For almost four decades, its institutional design stood 
out from all other dependent European central banks (apart from 
Switzerland’s), in particular in the degree to which it predefined the 
fiscal room for manoeuvre available to subordinate finance ministries 
and municipal treasuries (cf. Leaman 2001: 114ff.). It eschewed 
counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy as part of its primary task 
of ensuring ‘price stability’, invoking the quantity theory of money in 
its statements on changes in short-term refinancing rates (Discount 
and Lombard), setting targets for future money-supply growth and 
frequently defying the preferences of the federal government with 
interest rate rises in periods of cyclical contraction (ibid., 193ff.). 
Nevertheless, the relative success of the German political economy in 
maintaining lower-than-average rates of inflation in the Stagflation 
decade 1974-1986 was credited in large measure to the Bundesbank 
(e.g. Balkhausen 1992), rather than to Germany’s overall strengths as 
an innovative industrial and trading economy. This encouraged the 
popular (but syllogistic) view that operational autonomy was the 
precondition for a successful monetary policy. 
 
The corollary of Germany’s relative success in maintaining a low-
inflation economic culture was the emergence of significant 
asymmetries in both the current account balances of European and 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
economies and correspondingly wide disparities in the central bank 
rates of Germany’s European partners, as they sought to defend 
exchange rate parities with the German Mark (DM) and finance 
government borrowing; arguably the European Monetary System 
(EMS 1979 et seq.) reinforced the ‘exchange market mayhem’ 
(Eichengreen et al. 1995) by committing the system’s central banks to 
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defend parities against speculative attacks, thereby facilitating 
significant arbitrage gains.2  
 
 
¨ 
Figure 7.1: Central bank discount rates 1964–1998 in selected OECD 
countries. 
 
It was against the background of the chronic imbalances in the 
economies of the EMS member states and the unexpected collapse of 
the Soviet bloc and imminent German unification that the dormant 
plans for European Monetary Union (EMU) were revivified and 
accelerated. The need to contain any further strengthening of German 
economic hegemony – ‘Bundesbank hegemony’ according to Le 
Gloannec (2001) – informed the crisis diplomacy of 1990 and 1991. 
The fact that the primary vehicle of this policy of containment was 
the cloning of the Bundesbank in a supranational institution has been 
the subject of considerable debate (Marsh 1992; Kennedy 1991; Dyson 
and Featherstone 1999; Leaman 2001); the likening of the Maastricht 
Treaty and Germany’s abandonment of the totemic D-Mark to the 
Versailles Treaty (Le Figaro, 18 September 1992) underscores the 
extreme ambiguity of the birth of the euro. 
                                          
2 It was only when the EMS’ fluctuation bands were widened from +/- 2.5% to +/- 
15% in August 1993 that the feeding frenzy at the expense of EMS member states 
subsided. 
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Suffice it to say that the qualification process for EMU, its policy 
architecture and its operational processes institutionalised the 
asymmetries embodied in Germany’s lop-sided system of economic 
governance and pre-programmed further imbalances in European 
economic relations before and after 1999 and in particular in the 
current period of severe regional and global crises. The most obvious 
asymmetry is the decision to press ahead with a supranational 
monetary union and maintain national responsibility for fiscal policy, 
i.e. not to implement a parallel political union – a deficiency 
underscored by Bundesbank representatives among others (cf. 
discussion in Leaman 2001: 221f). Within this new nexus, however, 
the insistence (by the Bundesbank and the German Finance Ministry) 
on strict convergence criteria as conditions of membership and an on-
going commitment to budgetary consolidation by all member states 
represented a much tighter replication of Germany’s subordination of 
fiscal policy to monetary policy preferences (Heise 2002); the Stability 
and Growth Pact (1997) and the more recent the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) commitments to aggregate 
balanced budgets over the economic cycle and even more recent 
German moves to install a ‘debt brake’ on state bodies,3 reinforce this 
subordination, establishing what Abelshauser observed of German 
economic policy-making – that there was ‘no place for Keynesianism’ 
– as a general rule for Eurozone states (Abelshauser 1983: 106ff).  
 
What is notable about the Maastricht Convergence Criteria is that 
they omit a number of measures that might be considered essential 
for the establishment of an Optimal Currency Area (cf. Arestis and 
Sawyer 2011). While the narrowing of disparities in rates of inflation 
and market interest rates is an important precondition for commercial 
activity to prosper in an open-market, single currency union, the 
limitation of fiscal convergence criteria to annual public sector 
borrowing and overall state debt was always questionable. 
  
 Not only were the ceilings for PSBR (three per cent of GDP) 
and state debt (60 per cent) arbitrary and inflexible as guides 
to fiscal (un)sustainability (Eichengreen 1996), but there is a 
                                          
3 In 2009, both houses of the German parliament approved the introduction of a ‘debt 
brake’ (Schuldenbremse), which committed the federal government to respect a public 
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) ceiling of 0.35% of GDP from 2016 and the 16 
regional governments to incur no budget deficits at all after January 2020. 
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critical absence of any notion of the state’s ability to maintain 
the provision of public goods and absorb exogenous shocks 
through a robust and well-resourced tax system. Convergence 
to a minimum tax ratio and an approximate harmonisation of 
tax bases, in particular for mobile factors like corporate 
capital, would have rendered EMU much less vulnerable to 
cyclical disturbances in its weaker periphery and much more 
capable of achieving the modernisation objectives of the 
Lisbon Agenda or Europe 2020 through properly targeted 
programmes of innovation and productivity enhancement.  
 Also absent from the convergence criteria was any 
consideration of the disparities in current account balances 
which had grown significantly throughout the OECD since 
the 1970s and were indicative, in the case of countries with 
persistent and chronic deficits, of societies that were living 
beyond their means (producing less than they consume) and 
secondly of a constant need to rebalance their economies 
through the capital account. It is no coincidence that 
economies with low tax ratios (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) had 
significant current account deficits before 2008 (Table 7.1) and, 
after increasing problems raising money through sovereign 
bond auctions, were obliged to apply for assistance through 
the EFSF. The dependence on imported capital and low tax 
ratios are also evident across all of the newer member states, 
with serious implications for their ability to converge with the 
levels of economic performance of their EU15 partners. 
 Rates of employment/unemployment were also not 
considered significant enough to demand a degree of 
convergence, even though unemployment is indicative of 
macro-economic performance weaknesses, for example in unit 
wage costs, systems of wage-setting, levels of productivity, 
poorer education and training infrastructure and, not least, 
domestic demand.  
 The neglect of macro-economic demand as a factor in the 
determination of wealth-creation as well as in the setting of 
prices and wages – which frequently varies from one national 
economy to another – is typical of the mind-set of neo-liberal 
theorists with their emphasis on supply-side conditions. This 
problem includes, crucially, neglecting the strength of 
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demand as reflected in the changing distribution ratios of 
income and wealth. One of the greatest blind-spots of 
monetary policy, as exercised by both the Bundesbank and 
the ECB, was the neglect of a redistribution of national income 
resulting from the deflationary imperative and the 
deregulation of financial markets. In an early statement on its 
core operating principles, the ECB asserted confidently that: 
‘Maintaining price stability avoids the large and arbitrary 
redistribution of wealth and incomes that arises in inflationary as 
well as deflationary environments, and therefore helps to 
maintain social cohesion and stability’ (ECB 1999: 40, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Table 7.1: Tax ratios and current account balances in Europe 2008. 
Central and 
East Europ. 
Countries 
Tax 
Ratio* 
Current 
Account 
Balance* 
Countries of 
the EU15 
Tax 
Ratio* 
Current 
Account 
Balance* 
Albania 22.9 -11.3 Austria 43.4 3.8
Bosnia-Herz 41.2 -15.8 Belgium 46.8 -2.6
Bulgaria 34.4 -24.4 Denmark 50.0 2.0
Cyprus 36.6 -9.7 Finland 43.6 1.7
Czech Rep 36.3 -3.0 France 46.1 -1.9
Estonia 31.1 -10.8 Germany 40.6 6.6
Hungary 37.3 -8.2 Greece 33.5 -14.4
Latvia 30.4 -15.1 Ireland 34.0 -4.5
Lithuania 20.9 -14.9 Italy 42.6 -3.4
Macedonia 29.3 -14.0 Luxembourg 36.4 5.5
Malta 35.2 -7.7 Netherlands 39.5 7.5
Montenegro 28.0 -39.6 Portugal 37.0 -12.1
Poland 33.8 -5.5 Spain 37.3 -9.5
Romania 28.1 -13.8 Sweden 49.7 8.3
Serbia 34.1 -18.6 UK 39.0 -1.7
Slovakia 29.5 -6.5   
Slovenia 39.3 -4.7   
CEEC Ave 31.7 -13.7 EU15 Ave 41.3 -1.0
Baltic Ave 27.5 -13.6   
Visegrad + 1 35.2 -4.5   
Western 
Balkans Ave 
30.3 -18.1   
Note * As proportion of GDP. Averages are mathematical not weighted. 
Sources OECD, CIA, Eurostat, own calculations.    
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Figure 7.2: The redistribution of income in advanced economies 1980-
2005. 
Source IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2007, data for Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 7.2 indicates the dismal reality of the colossal redistribution of 
gross national income (market incomes before taxes and transfers), 
illustrated by the decline in the share of wages and salaries in the 
national income of advanced countries in the period of neo-liberal 
deregulation.  Europe’s record (a fall of 9.36 percentage points in 25 
years) is significantly higher than the average for advanced 
economies. The fall in the wages ratio corresponds to a similar rise in 
the profits ratio. There is little doubt that the dominance of the 
deflationary imperative under the Bundesbank’s hegemony of the 
EMS (Le Gloannec 2001: 123), and subsequently under the fiscal 
constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, contributed to this 
process. Bibow describes the dominant deflationary imperative as 
‘lived German stability culture with one own goal after another’ 
(Bibow 2011: 279). The redistribution, over which the ECB presided 
with apparent equanimity, had a critical effect on domestic demand 
structures in Europe, where typically private household demand 
makes up almost two thirds of aggregate demand. For those 
Eurozone economies, like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Belgium which are heavily dependent on net exports and which 
benefit from low stable real exchange rates and low unit labour costs, 
the German model has brought marginal gains. But, with high levels 
of intra-regional trade in the EU27 and the Eurozone in particular, the 
weakening of domestic demand through stagnating real wages 
ultimately becomes a negative sum game for all. Net disparities, after 
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taxation, social insurance contributions and state transfers are 
factored in, show a similar trend (OECD 2011; Schäfer 2009).  
 
Given that there had been persistent warnings about the reduced 
latitude in macro-economic policy for states that no longer had 
recourse to exchange rate devaluations to increase their trade 
competitiveness, the fixation on budgetary consolidation as a central 
fiscal condition of EMU membership indicates a dogmatic insistence 
on the sufficiency of market forces to rectify any residual national 
asymmetries in the political economy. This is confirmed in the ECB’s 
first monthly report in January 1999 which asserts that:  
 
Maintaining price stability in itself [sic] contributes to the 
achievement of output or employment goals. The logic 
underlying both the Treaty and the Eurosystem’s stability 
oriented monetary policy strategy is therefore that output and 
employment goals are best served by a monetary policy that 
focuses on price stability.  
(ECB 1999: 40) 
 
 
Figure 7.3:  Average annual growth of real GDP in selected world regions 
1990-2010.  
Source IMF World Economic Report 2011, Database. 
 
This faith in both the effective transmission mechanism of 
supranational monetary policy and the consequent benign effects on 
employment and growth was borne out neither in the preparatory 
phase for EMU (1992-98) nor in the subsequent growth cycles; in both 
periods the Eurozone remained the weakest region for real GDP 
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growth (Figure 7.3) and a weak performer in reducing 
unemployment.  
 
The causes lie arguably in both the flaws of monetary theory and the 
neo-liberal theory of efficient markets and in a seeming 
unwillingness/institutional inability to diagnose the critical changes 
that were affecting the global political economy, most notably in the 
financial sector. 
The privatisation of money 
One of the core articles of faith of monetarist theory is that a central 
bank, through the judicious deployment of its key instruments – 
short-term refinancing rates, open-market operations – can control 
the demand for credit, limit the growth of the money stock in its 
jurisdictional sphere of influence and thereby maintain price stability 
(actually mild inflation). Accordingly, the ECB established two 
central ‘reference values’ by which its performance could and should 
be measured: price inflation of approximately (but not exceeding) 
two per cent per annum and money stock (M3) growth of 4.5 per cent 
per annum. As Table 7.2 indicates, the Harmonised Index for 
Consumer Prices in the Eurozone showed inflation rates consistently 
above the reference value but not by much, suggesting the successful 
fulfilment of the ECB’s core task. 
 
Table 7.2:  Consumer price inflation (HICP), unit wage costs (UWC) and oil 
prices (Oil) 1991-2010 in the Eurozone economies; annual 
increase in per cent. 
  HICP UWC Oil 
1991-1995 3,2 2,5 -6,4 
1996-2000 1,6 0,8 19,0 
2000 2,1 1,3 81,3 
2001 2,3 2,7 -10,1 
2002 2,3 2,2 -4,7 
2003 2,1 1,8 -5,2 
2004 2,1 0,9 21,3 
2005 2,2 1,2 46,1 
2006 2,2 1,0 18,5 
2007 2,1 1,7 -0,2 
2008 3,3 3,6 24,8 
2009 0,3 3,9 32,3 
2010 1,6 -0,6 36,0 
 
The accompanying data, however, indicate that there is little 
evidence for wage-push inflation – a primary target of monetarist 
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orthodoxy – and overwhelming evidence for imported inflation via 
oil prices, in part driven by increased demand for oil from emerging 
economies but also, as demonstrated by a recent United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, by 
speculation and the ‘financialisation of commodity markets’ 
(UNCTAD 2011: 19). Unit wage costs grew by an annual average of 
1.5 per cent between 1996 and 2007; (the surprising jump in UWCs 
during the global crisis – see Table 7.2 – derives in large part from a 
combination of lower capacity utilisation and labour-hoarding). The 
average annual rise in oil prices was 21.6 per cent. Consumer price 
inflation was also affected by increases in ‘administrative prices’, 
namely rises in rates of VAT and excise duties, in part to compensate 
for reductions in direct rates of taxation. There was also little 
evidence of the business cycle overheating, as reflected by the modest 
development of GDP and its component domestic demand factors 
(Figure 7.4). With GDP growth averaging 1.8 per cent between 2000 
and 2008, private consumption in the Eurozone grew by an annual 
average of 1.4 per cent, state consumption by 1.9 per cent and gross 
investment by 1.8 per cent. Real net disposable income grew even less 
strongly in core EU countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands.4 
 
The modest growth of GDP was driven predominantly by exports 
(annual rate of growth of 5.7 per cent in the Eurozone between 1991 
and 2007). ECB data for sectoral contributions to value-added within 
the Eurozone also demonstrate the relative sluggishness of the 
primary and secondary sectors compared to financial services,5 but 
conceal the contribution that financial assets made to manufacturing 
profits in this period.6  
 
                                          
4 OECD figures available at: <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/real-
household-net-disposable-income_hsinc-table-2011-3-en>. 
5 Financial services enjoyed average annual growth rates of value added of 3.9% 
between 1996 and 2000, 2.1% between 2001 and 2005, and 1.8% between 2006 and 
2010; the figures for manufacturing are 2.8%, 1.2% and -0.7%; ECB Statistics Pocket 
Book (August 2011). 
6 Bundesbank data show marked increases in the ratio of financial assets to real 
assets in recent decades; cf. Leaman (2009). 
240 Jeremy Leaman
 
 
Figure 7.4:  Annual growth of GDP and its domestic components in the 
Eurozone economies 1991-2010 in per cent.  
Source European Central Bank (monthly statistics pocketbook, various). 
 
What is more revealing is the development of the money supply 
within the Eurozone; Figure 7.5 reveals a consistent and significant 
overshoot in the expansion of M3 between 1999 and 2008 beyond the 
‘reference value’ target of 4.5 per cent; by 2003, this overshoot was 
arguably embarrassing enough for the ECB to announce that it would 
‘no longer review the reference value for M3 on an annual basis 
because experience has shown that the underlying medium-term 
trend assumptions cannot be expected to change frequently’ (ECB 
2004: 64). 
 
 
Figure 7.5:  Growth of Money Stock M3 in the Eurozone.  
Source  European Central Bank.  
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This development and the extraordinary accompanying statement 
reflect, first and foremost, the relative powerlessness of the ECB – 
along with any central bank in the era of financialisation – to control 
directly the volume of base money: where banks and other financial 
institutions indulge in hyper-leveraging, through the multi-layered 
securitisation of loans and future income streams (where bond issues 
are given top credit ratings), ‘the central bank, if requested, cannot 
refuse to back these loans, if the system is to maintain its viability’ 
(Mellor 2010: 44). As Lapavitsas and Saad-Filho note: ‘consequently, 
the central bank cannot control the quantity of base money [...] loans 
make deposits, deposits make reserves, and credit money determines 
base money’ (2000: 311-12). 
 
The limited demand for central bank refinancing of retail and 
investment bank loans before, but particularly after 2008 is fairly 
evident; it demonstrates in recent history at the very least that rates of 
return on certain classes of investment were high enough to make the 
refinancing costs less relevant in an environment where, overall, 
growth was anaemic and unevenly spread between sectors. The era 
of ‘monetary accumulation’ (Altvater 1991) was ensuring pro tem 
strong demand for financial ‘products, which effectively diverted 
corporate reserves and ‘normal’ borrowing away from productive 
investments, with their higher rates of return. Additionally, however, 
the expansion of the interbank-market together with the facility of 
securitisation allowed banks to operate in part separately from 
systems under the notional control of central banks, reinforcing their 
ability to create money ex nihilo: 
 
Banks began to tap into the flow of money available by selling 
the debts they were issuing as an asset for investment, that is, 
as a security. Like the traders who once swapped the debts they 
held for ready bank money, banks started to swap the debts 
they held for ready money market finance. Investors would buy 
bank debt at a discount and receive a profit as the loans 
matured. This was a tremendous benefit for the banks’ balance 
sheet because whereas in the past banks kept the loans they 
made on their books, now they were sold on and were therefore 
‘off balance sheet’ and did not count against any lending ratios 
or against profits. More importantly, instead of loans that were 
slowly being paid off, the banks had more ready cash to expand 
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their business. The more debts the banks sold on the more 
profit they made against capital.  
(Mellor 2010: 47) 
 
The securitisation of credit card debt and later of mortgage debt was 
dominated by US investment banks, but their ‘asset-backed’ 
securities were bought by European and other finance houses on an 
increasingly large scale. Mortgage-backed securities multiplied from 
55 billion to 2,117 billion US dollars between 1990 and 2006 (Mellor 
2010: 48). A high proportion of these securities were channelled 
through ‘structured investment vehicles’, subsidiary entities of the 
major finance houses but increasingly held ‘offshore’ to avoid both 
tax liabilities and regulatory monitoring. This colossal ‘shadow 
banking’ system, which operated beyond the reach of even the weak 
influence of central banks, was regarded with benign indifference by 
the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England; it has 
nevertheless been estimated to have totalled between USD 10 and 12 
trillion by 2007, according to John McFall (2009), the chair of the UK 
Treasury Select Committee. It has also been estimated that, at the 
height of the derivatives boom, the total value of traded derivatives 
contracts stood at USD 2.29 quadrillion dollars (USD 
2,290,000,000,000,000) (cf. Leaman 2011). 
 
The relative immunity of transnational financial institutions and their 
non-bank counterparts to the ECB’s main instruments of monetary 
control (interest rates and open market operations [OMOs]) is 
demonstrated by the extensive use of both interbank markets and the 
shadow banking system, but also by the limited number of financial 
institutions that actually required the ECB’s open market operations; 
Frangakis (2011: 8) notes that in 2003 an average of only 252 out of a 
total of 6,776 financial institutions in the euro area were participating 
in short-term refinancing operations and just 136 in longer-term 
operations. The privatisation of money creation, beyond the control 
of central banks, was neither fully understood by central bankers nor 
properly identified as a systemic risk. The ‘liquidity factories’ 
(Phillips 2008: 185) were of benefit above all to territorially mobile 
corporations with their offshore Structured Investment vehicles 
(SIVs), whereas the credit conditions applying to nationally based 
SMEs were considerably less favourable (Carbo-Valverde et al. 2005). 
This of itself would strengthen the trend towards economic 
concentration. 
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As far as the ECB’s conduct of monetary policy is concerned, Bibow 
identifies a record of ‘asymmetrical interventions’, in particular with 
its interest rate moves; up until 2008 these were characterised by poor 
timing, where the Bank was frequently too eager to raise rates but 
later reluctant to lower them despite signs of cyclical weakening 
(Bibow 2011: 280). This is analogous to the record of the Bundesbank, 
though arguably much less extreme both in terms of the intensity and 
length of deflationary rate rises (cf. Leaman 2001: 232ff). There is, to 
some extent admittedly, an element of the ECB seeking to underscore 
its credibility as an autonomous institution (Frangakis 2011: 7) and 
defying the preferences of democratic authorities, but again its 
actions and pronouncements have been less obviously political than 
its predecessor. In general, the ECB can be credited with a greater 
degree of pragmatism in its conduct of Europe’s unique experiment 
in monetary union, albeit within an identifiably neo-liberal and mo-
netarist set of preferences (Frangakis 2011; Arestis and Sawyer 2011). 
 
While central bankers in Europe seemed to acknowledge that the 
boom in financial services entailed an increase in investment risk, 
there was – particularly in public statements – a general confidence 
that these risks could be cushioned by the new insurance vehicles 
deployed by the hedge fund sector. This confidence was best summa-
rized by the IMF in its annual report for 2006, i.e. two years before the 
greater follies of the sector’s risk management were revealed: 
 
[T]he dispersion of credit risk by banks to a broader and more 
diverse set of investors, rather than warehousing such risk on 
their balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and 
overall financial system more resilient. 
(IMF 2006: 51) 
 
This confidence was reinforced by the fact that the global financial 
system had absorbed the major shocks like the collapse of the hyper-
leveraged hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management in 1998, the 
end of the ‘dotcom-bubble’ in 2000 and the bankruptcy of Enron in 
2001. The apparent ability of the financial services sector to deliver 
low-inflation growth and high returns strengthened central bank 
views that the boom could be sustained without the danger of major 
‘deflations’ of asset bubbles. This confidence persisted until 2007. It is 
clear in retrospect that leading central bankers (Greenspan, Bernanke, 
Duisenberg, Trichet, King) were more impressed by the achievement 
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of relative price stability, and remained ignorant of the perilous levels 
of hyper-leveraging, the scale of shadow-banking and the abuse of 
secrecy jurisdictions underpinning the corporate world. Some 
worries were expressed by analysts within the Bank for International 
Settlements (cf. Tett 2009: 179ff.) at an earlier stage, but public 
expressions of concern remained limited; Trichet only raised doubts 
about ‘elements in global financial markets which are not necessarily 
stable’ at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2007. His 
statement is disarmingly honest: 
 
There is now such creativity of new and very sophisticated 
financial instruments, that we don’t know fully where the risks 
are located. We are trying to understand what is going on but it 
is a big, big challenge.  
(Trichet, quoted in Tett 2009: 181) 
 
A contributory factor to the previous indifference towards/ 
ignorance of systemic risks in the financial services sector on the part 
of the ECB was arguably the narrowness of its remit and the absence 
of any significant macro-prudential role, monitoring the 
diversification of financial institutions and the anatomy of the 
‘products’ they sold to investors (Frangakis 2011: 16ff). However, this 
does not constitute an excuse. 
 
In this context, a critical contradiction of the ECB’s counter-
inflationary stance is the deflationary zeal directed at consumer price 
inflation – the rise in the price of goods and services in the 
investment/production/consumption cycle – on the one hand, and 
the toleration or indeed applauding of the exaggerated appreciation 
in the value of specific asset classes, notably housing and share 
prices. The transformation of property finance and equity trading 
into dynamic vehicles for monetary accumulation had strong 
elements of the Emperor’s New Clothes in the mind-set of economic 
and political elites in advanced economies. House-price inflation 
became the pre-condition for the expansion of the pernicious 
‘originate-to-distribute’ system of covered bonds and their 
derivatives. Leveraged buy-outs and increasingly short-term 
shareholdings were the pre-condition for the artificial ramping-up of 
‘shareholder-value’ at the same time as aggregate real investment 
ratios were declining. Hyper-leveraging above all created a dynamic 
which could only be sustained by serial increases in levels of 
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borrowing and money-creation and, by definition, by increasing 
levels of exposure to extreme adjustments. The proximity of this 
process to Ponzi schemes was considerably closer than most people 
were prepared to admit. 
Monetary crisis management 
European monetarism has been played out both through the 
haphazard and uncertain pragmatism of the ECB and through its 
negative fiscal extension in the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition 
to the arbitrary thresholds for PSBR and state debt set in the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP (see above) the excessive deficit 
guidelines were similarly arbitrary and increasingly honoured more in 
the breach than in the observance. The fiscal latitude, allowed to each 
member state, was always extremely narrow and it compounded the 
limitation of macroeconomic policy choices available to governments 
that no longer had the devaluation option to compensate for trade 
and payments deficits. The disparities in the productivity levels of 
euro area states (GDP per capita), which were significant before 
EMU, have not been narrowed (Wilder 2011), with similar and critical 
problems of divergence applying to the newer member states 
(Halmai and Vásáry 2011). The ECB itself acknowledged the 
weakening of productivity growth across the whole of the euro area, 
particularly in comparison to the USA; its 2006 study draws attention 
to the associated deficiencies in realising the competitiveness 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda and proposes that “further efforts are 
needed to increase the share of R&D spending in a number of euro 
area countries” (ECB 2006: 24). While it is possible to blame those 
individual peripheral states with lower productivity for neglecting 
the appropriate investments in productivity-enhancing new 
technologies and in human capital, it is also quite legitimate to point 
the finger at the incessant pressure from ECOFIN and the ECB to 
consolidate budgets as a real and ideological obstacle to the process 
of convergence within the common currency zone. It would also have 
been appropriate for the Commission, together with ECOFIN to have 
included positive fiscal objectives within the SGP – minimum tax 
ratios, the strengthening of progressivity and transparency in 
taxation, expenditure ratio targets for education, training and 
innovation, etc. – rather than imposing the negative fiscal constraints 
of a growth-reducing austerity and relying on markets to allocate 
investment resources efficiently and evenly across all member states. 
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The chickens of the ‘stupidity pact’ (The Economist 22 October 2002 
quotes Romano Prodi’s description of the SGP as ‘stupid’) and of the 
deflationary imperative in general began to come home to roost in 
2009, as EU27 economies were affected by different levels of severe 
contraction. The contradictions in European monetary policy became 
even more crass, however. The ECB reduced its repurchasing rate 
significantly (from 4.25 per cent in July 2008 to one per cent in May 
2009) in the early stages of the crisis, eased its refinancing conditions; 
it extended the list of assets accepted as collateral, providing 
unlimited liquidity to the market, and bought up some 60 billion 
euros worth of high risk covered bonds. However, at an early stage in 
2009 it was already talking about the withdrawal of special measures 
and the need to return to strict budgetary consolidation as soon as 
possible. This betokened at the very least a dramatic underestimation 
of the severity and probable duration of the new crisis of finance 
capitalism.  
 
The Commission’s contribution to crisis management was even more 
confusing: on the one hand, it put itself at the head of the efforts of 
core-EU15 states to neutralise the financial meltdown and to 
counteract their unprecedented recessionary contractions in 2008 and 
2009. On the other hand, in the same period it was enjoining several 
new member states – most notably the three Baltic states – to address 
their budget deficits, even though their overall debt levels were 
considerably lower than the EU15 average, and even though they 
were all suffering double-digit recessions (see European Commission, 
2009: 62, 85, 81, etc.; see also Leaman 2009: 12). Despite the 
extraordinary circumstances of global financial crisis, a severe 
regional recession and the first contraction of global trade for 
decades, the Commission also continued to implement ‘excessive 
deficit procedures’ (EDPs) in 2009 and 2010 (Table 7.3). 26 out 27 EU 
member states were in the throes of deep recessions, exceeding the 
EDP ‘exceptionality threshold’ of a two per cent contraction of real 
GDP, all the major finance ministries were seeking to prevent 
financial mayhem, sterilising toxic assets and taking major equity 
stakes in bankrupt banks, and the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Directorate was indulging in the tragi-comedy of issuing parking 
tickets in a war-zone. 
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Table 7.3:  EU excessive deficit procedures 2008-2009. 
Country Date of the 
Commission 
report 
(Art.104.3/126.3) 
Council Decision 
on existence of 
excessive deficit 
(Art.104.6/126.6) 
Current deadline 
for correction 
Bulgaria 12 May 2010 13 July 2010 2011 
Denmark 12 May 2010 13 July 2010 2013 
Cyprus 12 May 2010 13 July 2010 2012 
Austria 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Belgium 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2012 
Czech Republic 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Germany 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Italy 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2012 
The Netherlands 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Portugal 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Slovenia 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Slovakia 7 October 2009 2 December 2009 2013 
Poland 13 May 2009 7 July 2009 2012 
Romania 13 May 2009 7 July 2009 2012 
Lithuania 13 May 2009 7 July 2009 2012 
Malta 13 May 2009 7 July 2009 2011 
France 18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2013 
Latvia 18 February 2009 7 July 2009 2012 
Ireland 18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2015 
Greece 18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2014 
Spain 18 February 2009 27 April 2009 2013 
UK 11 June 2008 8 July 2008 financial year 
2014/15 
Hungary 12 May 2004 5 July 2004 2011 
 
Source European Commission. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm>.   
 
The ECB, true to its word, sought to phase out its temporary 
emergency measures in December 2009, even though financial 
markets were still extremely reluctant to revivify interbank trading 
and expand overdrafts and long-term credit to non-banks. In her 
recent paper on the ECB’s crisis management, Marica Frangakis 
provides graphic evidence for the commercial banks’ deployment of 
the extra liquidity intended (by the ECB) for relubricating commercial 
credit lines (Figure 7.6). 
 
The removal of emergency measures was reversed by the ECB in the 
spring of 2010, as the spill-over effects of state bank-salvage 
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operations and automatic stabilisers on state expenditure and 
borrowing generated the euro area’s persistent and worsening 
sovereign debt crisis. A new ‘Securities Market Programme’ allowed 
interventions by the central banks of the Euro-system to be 
conducted in both public and private securities markets. With 
purchases of sovereign bonds only permitted via secondary markets, 
an unequivocal bias is evident, as Frangakis correctly observes: 
 
Thus in the face of the public debt crisis [...] the ECB aided the 
euro area banking system through the direct and indirect 
provision of funds – refinancing and buying bonds on the 
primary and secondary markets – whereas it aided the euro 
area governments through the indirect provision of funds only 
– buying bonds on the secondary bond markets. In monetarist 
terms, this is supply-side economics and in political terms, it is 
favouring the private sector over the public one.  
(Frangakis 2011: 14) 
 
 
Figure 7.6:  Deposits by monetary financial institutions with the Eurosystem 
(outstanding amounts in million euros), Sept. 1997 - Feb. 2011. 
 
Source  Frangakis 2011, p. 13. 
 
Figure 7.6 demonstrates the fruitlessness of the ECB’s efforts with the 
sudden upsurge in bank deposits back into the Eurosystem, rising by 
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over 800 billion euros between the end of 2008 and early 2010. The 
more recent (October 2011) focus on the solvency of a wide set of 
European banks (Donahue 2011) indicates, at the very least, that the 
recapitalisation of banks through the blanket provision of central 
bank liquidity (‘quantitative easing’ in UK parlance) has failed both 
to generate new expansionary circuits of private credit and to prevent 
the serial down-grading of the credit ratings of both banks and 
European states. 
 
The sovereign debt crisis has, above all, revealed the deficiencies of 
an asymmetrical EMU which has been subjected to a shock generated 
by a related asymmetrical global order, for which its overall guiding 
theory – monetarism and neo-liberal supply-sidism – is co-
responsible. The neglect of demand factors in the construction of a 
union between countries of divergent levels of development, the 
neglect of fiscal harmonisation as a precondition for economic 
convergence and the minimisation of crisis-driven fiscal equalisation, 
the delusionary faith in the efficient allocation of resources among 
divergent economies via liberalised markets – these core deficiencies 
are as manifest in the shambolic management of the sovereign debt 
crisis as the failure of national and international regulatory regimes to 
diagnose the ‘fool’s gold’ empire of global finance before September 
2008. 
 
Above all the sovereign debt crisis reveals the restored thraldom of 
fiscal states to the socially and ethically rootless army of financialised 
capitalism which they had just saved from self-destruction. In the 
absence of a correct appreciation of the scale of this crisis, the 
unresolved disparities of the asymmetrical union have rendered that 
union vulnerable to the same processes of rent-seeking speculation 
and ratings charlatanism (cf. Kettle 2010; Fricke 2011) that the neo-
liberal disaster let loose on struggling democratic cultures. 
 
The naivety of a one-size-fits-all monetarism has created an 
unsustainable European political economy, intractably rooted in an 
increasingly dysfunctional German model of export-led growth 
which cannot hope to resolve the dilemma of chronic current account 
surpluses and chronic current account deficits.  
 
The widening of bond spreads, afflicting the Eurozone since the 
spring of 2010, was entirely predictable: 
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 The new risk-aversion of financial institutions was dramatically 
demonstrated by the sudden paralysis of the inter-bank market; 
 Lower-than-average tax ratios in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
combined with rising external deficits, made these states both 
dependent on imported capital and less capable of generating 
future revenue streams to repay short-term loans (Table 7.1); 
 The Irish state was overwhelmed by the scale of its 
commitments to salvaging its banking system, which involved 
sums of over 200 per cent of GDP and drove a modest state 
debt ratio (28.8 per cent of GDP in 2007) to over 100 per cent in 
three years. 
 
Accordingly, the need for fiscal transfers from other euro area states 
was also predictable, given the level of exposure of German, French, 
Italian and other banks to the endangered bond issues of peripheral 
states. The absence of a refined system of fiscal equalisation within 
EMU, and in particular the absence of a common euro area bond, 
rendered the negotiations towards a stabilisation facility vulnerable 
to political/electoral pressures within individual member states, 
most notably within Germany with its brittle and unreflective new 
coalition. EMU heads of state were in consequence consistently 
behind the loop, reacting to rather than controlling events. The 
consequent cost of ‘stabilisation’ to all participant states is 
considerably higher than it needed to have been. More importantly, 
the conditionalities attached to the fiscal transfers are fatally 
informed by the simple logic of (German) austerity preferences and 
fail to address fundamental problems of divergence: 
 
 Levels of productivity and unit wage costs – root causes of 
international competitiveness and hence current account 
deficits – can only be addressed by an intensified commitment 
of state resources to research, development and skill capacities 
within a country’s economic culture; 
 Low tax ratios, reinforced by beggar-thy-neighbour tax-rates 
(Ireland) or weak administration and compliance (Greece) are 
incompatible with an open and mutually supportive currency 
union; the ‘free rider’ option of poaching the tax bases of other 
member states, as pursued by Ireland, is corrosive of such 
support; 
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 Austerity, as demanded by Germany’s export-led model, has 
demonstrably failed to encourage growth within the euro area, 
but has rather compounded the asymmetries of demand and 
the mal-distribution of income and wealth; 
 In an integrated region of production and trade, the common 
pursuit of an export-led recovery is self-defeating; we cannot all 
trade our way out of recession and state debt.  
 
The conclusions to be drawn from this brief survey of monetarist 
policies within Europe are sobering and challenging, but the real 
achievements of European integration can only be maintained by a 
decisive step-change in its institutional arrangements. There are clear 
doubts about the whether the leading figures of the EU and its 
member states have the ability or desire, collectively, to make that 
step change and to prevent the fragmentation that threatens the 
project. The conclusions would nevertheless seem to be: 
 
1. The policy architecture of the euro area requires the 
formalisation of a fiscal union which allows both common 
sovereign bond-issuance and the flexible interpretation of 
deficit and debt levels to facilitate real convergence of 
productivity and unit labour costs; i.e. short-term sovereign 
debt expansion for weaker states must be acknowledged as a 
necessary pre-condition of economic modernisation, not as a 
structural obstacle to market-led growth qua ‘crowding out’. 
Such flexibility must be conditional on the abandonment of 
free-rider fiscal strategies and the implementation of a common 
campaign to end tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
2. There has to be a recalibration of demand within member 
states, which reverses the erosion of domestic demand through 
neo-liberal redistribution strategies in core states with chronic 
surpluses; this would have to involve wage-setting which 
matched wages to productivity gains and the restoration of 
effective tax progressivity throughout the EU27 (i.e. the 
abandonment of flat tax regimes) as a pre-condition for the 
improved provision of public goods. 
3. The structural disparities between states with chronic external 
surpluses and states with chronic external deficits require a 
refined system of fiscal equalisation both within the euro area 
252 Jeremy Leaman
 
but also within the EU27 as a whole; this would involve the 
enhancement of the admirable system of structural funds 
(Cohesion Funds) through measures targeted at the 
modernisation of weaker sectors in weaker regions. It would 
also mean bridging assistance to peripheral states to prevent 
any further erosion of welfare arrangements. 
4. The interdependence of the secular economy of a highly 
integrated group of countries requires the harmonisation of key 
fiscal arrangements (a common corporate tax base, minimum 
rates of direct taxation and country-by-country reporting), the 
co-ordination of macro-economic policy institutions and a 
reduction in the ‘democratic deficits’ of current institutional 
systems. This has to mean an end to central bank autonomy, an 
increased role for the European Parliament and the acceptance 
of qualified majority voting in reform programmes relevant to 
macro-economic crisis-management. 
 
The chances of these ideas being realised, not to mention of Europe 
adjusting to the inevitability of weaker growth patterns, cannot be 
high, judging by the current atmosphere of nationalist populism 
emerging within individual states. If Europe’s deep crisis bore the 
physical signs of a destructive war, the chances of a collective 
enterprise aimed at restoring a sustainable economic and social order 
to the continent – as in the 1950s – would arguably be greater. The 
real nature of the crisis, however, looks like having economic 
consequences as critical as those of a continental war, without its 
severity being recognized soon enough by policy-makers. Weaning 
ourselves off an addictive dependence on hyper-leveraged finance 
capitalism will take decades of adjustment, to add to the challenges of 
demographic change and environmental sustainability. 
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